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Abstract
This study contributes to ongoing attempts by
scholars to understand the many ways that social
media is being used by disaster and crisis response
actors. We present a case study consisting of
emergency response organizations, government
agencies, local government, non-government
organizations, community groups and platform-based
actors, and focus specifically on how social media is
used in this context to support the information needs
of vulnerable groups. We examine how tension
between the presence of top-down, generic
information and the need for contextualized and
specific information is resolved, and the translation
processes that occur between the range of actors. We
also offer recommendations for future research to
address the disproportionate impacts of disasters and
crises on vulnerable groups.

1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing interest in
the field of research known as ‘crisis informatics’ [1,
2]. This field combines social science and computing
knowledge to better understand how organizations
and people use digital technology to respond to
disasters and crises [3], such as wildfires, hurricanes,
and earthquakes. Within the crisis informatics
research we draw on and contribute to two streams.
The first focuses on how technology can improve
inter-organizational
collaboration,
information
sharing and other operational areas of response
efforts [4, 5]. Studies in this stream examine
emergency response organizations (EROs) such as
police and fire, government agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and community
and volunteer groups. Recent research in this stream
demonstrates how digital technology—in particular

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59736
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Marta Poblet
RMIT University
marta.pobletbalcell@rmit.edu.
au

Peter Hayes
RMIT University
peter.hayes2@rmit.edu.
au

social media1—is resulting in porous boundaries
between these organizations, challenging the
bureaucratic and top-down logic of coordination and
information sharing [6-8]. With few exceptions [8],
little research has sought to understand the evolving
information landscape of actors such as EROs and
government agencies (who we refer to as ‘upstream’
actors) and informal organizations such as NGOs,
community groups, local social media networks and
private/platform-based organizations (who we refer
to as ‘downstream’ actors)2, as they seek to access
and provide information to each other and their
constituents. The second stream of research focuses
on how social media is used by individuals and how
crowdsourced data is used to inform decision making
and enhance situational awareness of EROs and
government agencies [1, 8, 9]. While this research
has grown significantly, it has neglected the interplay
of social media and the evolving landscape of
organizations; in particular, how downstream actors
use social media to interpret, translate and
contextualize top-down information as well as to
provide information to specific audiences.
We bring these two streams of research together
to examine how the range of organizations use social
media to address the concerns of vulnerable
persons—defined broadly as a group or community
whose circumstances create challenges to obtaining,
understanding or seeking information, or to their
ability to respond in the same way as the general
population [10]. This framing typically encompasses
older, disabled, lower socio-economic, isolated and
marginalized persons [11]. While these groups are
sidelined in the crisis informatics literature, reports
and studies demonstrate that they suffer
disproportionately from disasters and crises [12, 13].
1

By social media we refer to Web 2.0 platforms/mobile apps that
allow for the creation and sharing of user-generated content.
2
Upstream and downstream refers to position in the information
hierarch; whereby information is distributed from the EROs and
government agencies (upstream) for action, interpretation and
contextualization by actors downstream.
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A focus on vulnerable persons is important given the
frequent pattern of information provision during a
disaster: typically, upstream actors such as EROs and
government agencies provide warnings and
information to the public (the top-down logic),
information that tends to be generic. This is in
tension with the often specific information needs and
technology practices of vulnerable persons [7]. We
examine how this tension is resolved by community
groups and NGOs—using social media and other
means—to provide contextualized content and reach
out to vulnerable groups. Scholars have called for
research to focus on the specific information needs
vulnerable groups as well as how they use social
media [7].
We address the research question: In the context
of disasters and crises, how do actors use social
media to provide information to vulnerable persons?
To address this question, we undertake a qualitative
case study consisting of 28 organizations. Our sample
includes actors across the spectrum—including
upstream
and
downstream
response
and
service/information providers involved in the disaster
preparation, mitigation, response and recovery
phases.
We demonstrate how the organizational actors
adapt generic disaster information and contextualize
it for vulnerable persons, and the different social
media strategies used for doing so. At the same time,
we identify tensions between consistent and reliable
information, the need for specificity, and the role of
technology; by doing so we render this tension more
visible to theorizing. In adding to the literature on
disaster and crisis response actors [6, 14] we
highlight the need to take more seriously how this
kaleidoscopic network can better support the needs of
vulnerable persons. To address the needs of
vulnerable persons and develop resilient communities
it is necessary, we argue, to capture and grasp
complex interactions between the different
stakeholders.
In what follows, we first consider the relevant
research and focus on three themes that inform our
study (Section 2). In Section 3 we describe the setting
of our study and the methods used to collect and
analyze our data. Section 4 presents our findings.
Section 5 outlines the key theoretical contributions
and directions for future research.

2. Relevant work
From our review of the literature, three major
themes inform our study. The first theme deals with
the network of actors in disaster and crisis response.
The second covers work related to information

challenges and the mediating role of digital
technology. The third relates to addressing the needs
of vulnerable populations. In the following subsections, we examine the contributions of each
theme.

2.1 Multilayered and converging actors
Responding
to
complex,
high-velocity,
unpredictable, and time-critical incidents requires
rapid and simultaneous intervention from different
organizations [14-16]. The possible arrangement of
organizations, structures, and divisions of tasks are
traditionally framed as four archetypes [17]. The first
are ‘established’ organizations, such as the EROs,
that undertake tasks (e.g. manage fires, close roads),
or other government agencies involved in managing a
disaster or crisis as part of their core responsibility
(e.g. a government department of health or a central
emergency organization). These organizations are at
the apex of a bureaucratic or top-down structure [7].
Second are ‘expanding’ organizations, which consist
of a small standing organization and a larger group of
trained staff/volunteers that can be mobilized. These
organizations, such as the Red Cross, can expand and
retract as needed. Third are ‘extending’ organizations
that perform tasks outside of their traditional role
(e.g. organizations that supply food, shelter and
logistical support). Fourth are ‘emergent’ groups,
such as community groups and volunteers that often
have fluid memberships that perform non‐regular
tasks [15]. While established organizations are often
the lead agency during disaster and crisis, the other
levels are more dynamic and fill the gaps left by the
established organizations. In the structure described,
information is distributed from the established actors
(i.e. upstream actors) for action, interpretation and
contextualization by downstream actors.
Studies have built on the four-level
conceptualization of organizational types by
demonstrating how organizations form clusters to
collectively coordinate efforts to handle unfolding
disaster events [14] or how digital technology breaks
down boundaries between organizations and
activities [6]. For instance, the Red Cross created the
Ready2Help platform that matched individuals
needing help with people who could offer it [6]; other
examples include crowdsourcing and mapping
platforms that guide relief efforts. Citizens,
volunteers and community groups are also leveraging
digital technologies—social media in particular—to
address emergent demands and fill localized
information and support needs [18]. These emergent
digital networks typically form when a crisis presents
itself and may develop into stable organizations (e.g.
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local groups connected by social media). These shifts
suggest the convergence of organizational boundaries
and activities as well as the convergence of physical
and online spaces [6, 8]. While this presents new
opportunities, it also raises challenges for providing
effective support, and consistent and relevant
information. As the number of actors grows, the
priorities of these actors will overlap: across time
(e.g. the preparedness, mitigation, response and
recovery phases); across space in terms of the spatial
dimension of a disaster; across different stakeholder
groups; and across information management
capabilities in terms of acquisition, processing and
content, sources and dissemination. As the
interactions and relationships between organizations,
individuals and technology move away from the
bureaucratic, top-down logic, they become more
complex and may result in behavior that is difficult to
predict [7].

2.2 Information and digital technology
Disasters and crises are characterized by several
types of information challenge that complicate the
responses of organizations and individuals. For
instance, the most appropriate channels for
distributing and sharing information, its format and
content, and the volume, veracity and timing of
information [2]. Evidence clearly suggests that the
quality of information sharing and communication
can reduce the risk from disasters and support
recovery [2, 19] and that many disaster related deaths
may have been saved ‘with better information and
communication’ [20]. For instance, an investigation
into heat waves in France concluded that access to
basic information, such as advice to wrap yourself in
damp cloths or drink enough cold water, could have
reduced the death toll amongst the elderly [11]. As
well as saving lives, information reduces suffering in
the recovery phase by helping victims to trace lost
family and friends, to find out what aid they are
entitled to and where to seek shelter [20]. A
challenge that remains is a lack of understanding on
how to frame information [21]; specifically, how
information and warnings are best provided and the
ability of humans to interpret information on lowprobability and high-intensity incidents. For instance,
studies have argued that warnings such as ‘Do Not
Panic’, ‘Amber Alert’ or ‘Stay/Go’ are confusing and
do not inform citizens whether they should be
alarmed or what action they should take [19, 21].
Therefore, citizens are faced with the challenges of
sensemaking and assessing information accuracy
under dangerous conditions [22]. Increasing the
volume of warnings also raises the possibility of

information overload, resulting in citizens neglecting
critical information or it triggering inappropriate and
counterproductive responses. This critically includes,
but is not limited to, delaying responses [21] or
overreacting and responding to misinformation [23].
For our study, research demonstrates that citizens’
actions are most strongly predicted when emergency
communications are received from neighborhood and
community member sources rather than sources
detached from the local setting [24], presenting an
important challenge to the bureaucratic and top-down
mode of information dissemination. Communities are
inherently different and need targeted information,
tailored to the disaster type and community
composition. In addition, information needs to be
two-way, so that those at risk in a disaster or crisis
can provide and receive specific advice about their
household and what action to take to protect
themselves and their property [24].
To address the foregoing information challenges
there has been a push towards digital technology such
as social media (but also mobile/web-based systems)
for transmitting fast and clear information [25, 26].
This has been critical for both disseminating
information (e.g. coping strategies, precautionary
advice) and collecting information from at-risk
populations. There is evidence of social media being
linked to protective action against a hazard [1] and
allowing segments of the community that have not
participated in traditional ways to connect with
government agencies and EROs [9]. Importantly
though, this research recognizes that the volume of
social media data has introduced challenges around
reliability and veracity of information, thus,
diminishing peoples' ability to find the information
needed to organize relief efforts, find help and
potentially save lives [27, 28]. Some research
suggests a mismatch between use of social media by
response organizations and the expectations for their
use held by the general public [1]. At the
organizational level this can be explained by
deficiencies in strategy and training, uncertainty, and
lack of resources to make meaningful use of social
media or make sense of the data [28].

2.3 A focus on vulnerable persons
The foregoing sub-sections point to an increasing
diversity of actors and a growing role for digital
technology in disaster contexts, while at the same
time
acknowledging
information
challenges.
Typically, academic research that addresses these
issues treats individuals and communities as
homogenous [29]. However, post-disaster reports
across the globe—e.g. from Australian bushfires and
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3. Research study
We undertook a case study examining a range of
actors involved in providing information and/or
responding to disasters and crisis in a State of
Australia. The case is interesting because the State
implemented the ‘One Source, One Message’
paradigm of information dissemination to ensure
consistent, trusted information and communication.
The case allows us to pay attention to tensions
between actors, information flows both upstream and
downstream, and the translation processes that occur.
We followed an interpretive case study approach,
which is well-suited to illuminating the use of
information systems in organizations [31]. We
interviewed 43 stakeholders across 28 organizations
(see Table 1). Drawing on multiple organizations
allowed us to explore the case from diverse and

multilayered perspectives [32]. Our sampling
approach can be defined as purposive as we
identified actors, predominantly through professional
networks and online searches; this was then
complemented by a snowballing technique. A semistructured interview schedule was followed which
focused on the organization’s role, how it shares
information, the tools it uses (with a focus on social
media), how it reaches out to specific communities,
and its inter-organizational information sharing
approaches and challenges3. While most studies are
framed around a specific incident such as a bushfire,
hurricane or flood [18, 19], interviewees in our study
were free to reflect on a range of incidents [33].
Interviewees reflected on several disasters that they
vividly recollected, predominantly bushfires, floods
and heatwaves. Importantly, the reflections accounted
for incidents over time, covering multiple instances
rather than a single snapshot of the study phenomena.
They referred to a range of vulnerable groups such as
older persons, socially/geographically isolated
persons, and refugee/recent migrant communities, as
well as transient persons such as tourists (an at-risk
group during bushfires). Interviews were conducted
face-to-face or over the phone. Most interviews were
audio-recorded with the permission of the
interviewee, or comprehensive notes were taken,
allowing the discussion to be reconstructed
immediately after the interview.

Upstream  downstream

earthquake and tsunami in Japan [12, 13]—have
highlighted the disproportionate number of fatalities
amongst groups defined as ‘vulnerable’. As noted,
this category typically encompasses older, disabled,
lower socio-economic and marginalized persons.
There are also meta-categories such as lack of access
to resources or services, isolation, and temporal
dimensions to vulnerability. Vulnerable persons
suffer from disasters for a number of reasons,
including lack of mitigating actions and uninformed
decision making [30]. This is not limited to the
immediate threat of a disaster itself. For example, the
IFRC [20, 30] found that certain groups such as the
elderly, disabled, widowed, and tenant women endure
multiple discriminations when attempting to access
information, relief assistance, and reconstruction
subsidies. Individuals within these groups often have
different
information
behaviors,
technology
availability, or digital literacy and practices, and rely
heavily on (offline) social networks [11, 24].
In terms of institutional responses, despite their
increased risk, these groups are often given low
priority and little attention before, during, and after
disasters, with few government agencies, NGOs or
guides dedicated specifically to their unique needs
[30]. Governments and aid agencies often assume
individuals are looked after by their community or
family [23] and that mass distribution of information
will reach them. However, this is not necessarily the
case and information services such as mobile
messaging and the Internet may also be disrupted by
the disaster. Consequently, vulnerable individuals are
often left to cope alone [20], remain invisible and
marginalized, and find it hard to obtain humanitarian
relief, information, and economic and social support
[20, 30].

Org.
Gov.
agencies

Table 1. Data collection
Example org.
Central organizing agency;
Fire and Emergency
Services Authority
Police; Fire brigade
Local councils

EROs
Local
gov.
Comm.
International NGO; local
groups,
community groups;
NGOs
auxiliary response groups
Platform Sharing economy firm,
org.
not-for-profit
*Number of organizations / interviewees

No.*
4/10

3/8
5/9
14/14

2/2

In addition to the interviews, study participants
were forthcoming with numerous additional materials
regarding their work. Illustrative examples include
both an NGO and local government disaster guide
and preparation manual, and ERO and government
strategic reports. These materials contributed to our
understanding of organizational strategies and
procedures.
3

The interview schedule is accessible at https://bit.ly/2Pv1mBU
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Data collection and analysis were conducted
simultaneously so understanding could emerge from
the theoretical concepts and empirical content. The
interviews were transcribed verbatim and entered into
NVivo qualitative software for analysis, as were
notes and memos. In total, 620 pages of qualitative
data were analyzed. Saturation point was reached
when no new themes emerged from the data.
Our coding sequence followed the logic of open
coding, axial coding, and selective coding, and the
constant comparative method [34]. To ensure a
systematic and reliable coding process, two authors
analyzed each transcript; after analysis of each
transcript we compared and contrasted codes to
negotiate a consolidated yet evolving code book.
Through multiple rounds of axial coding we
identified relationships among the open codes. As our
analysis developed, we applied selective coding to
address our research question, focusing more on
conceptual abstraction (or the ‘story-line’) based on
our insights into the research [34]. This allowed us to
manage the volume of data and constantly organize
codes into a coherent structure. In the analysis
presented here we rely heavily on interview quotes
and examples as interpretative evidence; building an
analytical and explanatory narrative account.

4. Findings
Our findings focus on two key aspects relevant to
our
research
question:
the
links
and
interdependencies between the organizations, with a
focus on information and the role of social media;
and the dominant strategies and translation processes
that unfold between the actors. Our sample
comprised a diverse set of organizations. Table 2,
based on the analysis of interviews and
organizational documents summarizes how they
address the informational needs of vulnerable
persons, the role of social media in the work of that
organization, the specificity of information provided,
and the directional information flow. While the table
presents the activities of actors as silos, there existed
clear interdependencies amongst them. Notably, a
mandated Joint Standard Operating Procedure guided
hierarchical flow of information from the central
government actor to EROs, local governments and
NGOs, which filtered through to community groups.
it’s about having, you know, one place for people
to look at for all emergencies…And then it’s
about actually having a suite of tools for them to
actually access this information…So, it’s actually
about having the suite of information or having
the one place to have incidents published, the
suite of information to actually get it out there,

yes, which I know sounds really simplistic
(GOV2).
This hierarchy extended to one of the platformbased actors that had formal strategies in place with
government actors to provide disaster related
information to customers. While pointing to a topdown information hierarchy, more dynamic and twoway information flows mediated by social media [1]
also played a significant role.
social media has to be a part of the
communication suite that we use. So, yes, it’s
come a long way. And also from a community
perspective, you know, there’s an expectation that
they can contact us and that we will speak to them
(ERO2).
Table 2 (column 4) indicates that the specificity
and contextualization of information increased
amongst the downstream actors, as they followed a
more organic approach to understanding the
complexities of community response and needs of
vulnerable persons: ‘shining a light in dark places
that government isn’t really interested in’ (NGO1).
Upstream actors—the EROs and government
agencies—followed multi-channel approaches to
information sharing, as mandated in their operating
procedures. In terms of social media, this included
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram (with some
exploration of Chinese-focused social media like
WeChat), and was complemented by digital
technology including organizational websites, SMS
and mobile apps. Platform-based actors relied on
their platforms for engaging with vulnerable persons.
One used its platform to match vulnerable persons
with people that could help. The other distributed
top-down information to its users and pointed them to
government sources, following the ‘one source, one
message’ paradigm: ‘messaging is sent as soon as an
incident is confirmed and sufficient safety
information is being updated from local authorities’
(PLA1). It also shares this information via Twitter
and Facebook.
We typically do not provide such warnings
(tailored to specific vulnerable groups), our
messaging includes links to local officials where
guests and hosts can receive latest updates on the
situation as it unfolds (PLA1)
NGOs/community organizations predominantly
relied on Facebook as their information-sharing
medium and space for networking and connecting.
For some locally focused community groups
Facebook was the glue that held them together and
provided an alternative to traditional top-down
information [18].

Page 2999

Org.
Gov.
agencies

EROs

Table 2. Focus on vulnerable, social media and information flows
Focus on vulnerable
How social media is used
Specificity of information and
communities
information flow
Provide information to wider
Provide guidance and
Broad scope, incident specific
community; some provision to
information to community;
information. Emphasis of flow from
engage the vulnerable
engage with the wider
agency to community. Some flow
specifically.
community; gather intelligence. from community to agencies.
Provide information to wider
community; some provision to
engage the vulnerable
specifically.

Provide guidance and
information to community;
engage with the wider
community; gather intelligence.

Broad scope, incident specific
information. Emphasis of flow from
government to ERO to community.
Some flow from community to
EROs.
Local
Identify the vulnerable and
Provide guidance and
District- or community-centric.
gov.
develop suitable
information to community;
Information flow largely from local
communication/support
engage with the wider
government to community. Some
activities.
community; gather intelligence. flow from community to local
government.
Comm.
Utilize local networks and
A forum for sharing of
Local community; combine
groups,
connections to identify and
information/networking;
information from official sources
NGOs
support community member
localized intelligence; ‘go to’
with localized content; sharing local
needs, including vulnerable
source of information.
knowledge/information; greater
persons.
multi-directional information flow.
Platform Provide information to wider
Provide guidance and
Customer-centric; use largely
org.
community; connect persons
information to customers.
government and ERO content to
that need help.
assist customers; or not providing
guidance or information at all.
Having sketched out the activities and
the lesser information flows from the downstream
interdependencies of organizations we turn to
actors to the government agencies/EROs). Upstream
examining the strategies and translation processes
actors explained that their internal analysis of how
that take place across the organizations in engaging
their social media content is used shows
with vulnerable groups. Figure 1 (Appendix 1)
‘intermediaries’ or ‘information brokers’ [35] are
presents a process chart of the information flows as
often an important part of the network as they act as
derived from the qualitative data. Similar to Adrot
information intermediaries for vulnerable persons.
and Figueiredo [16] it illustrates the intensity of ties,
Therefore, it is a matter of using social media to ‘tie
with a focus on information. Upstream actors were
into local trusted networks’ (GOV4) and
acutely aware of the risk to vulnerable persons and
understanding where vulnerable persons are
had formulated strategies for engaging them.
connected to the community.
Many of those messages are targeted directly to
There will be people who have no connection, I
vulnerable people. So, people with a disability,
absolutely accept that, but there will be people
people caring for children, or elderly people
who are connected into something, and it's just
(GOV3)
understanding what that something is (GOV2)
For this reason, there are strong links between
government agencies and NGOs that work directly
with vulnerable persons. The NGOs have direct
access to these groups and undertake community
engagement—'their resource (a planning guide) for
engaging with more vulnerable members of the
community around, so their social preparedness, you
know, the need to know your neighbours’ (GOV3).
As noted in Figure 1, upstream actors
predominantly push out information (as indicated by
the thickness of the lines; the thinner lines indicate

It may also involve social media campaigns that
target persons who act as information brokers. For
example:
for the heat campaign, we target middle aged
women, because they are more likely to look after
young children, as well their elderly parents, who
are both vulnerable people in heat (GOV2)
This builds on the realization that social media
content is often shared. As well as direct
communication, it is used to arm individuals with
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information that can be relayed (offline) to vulnerable
persons: ‘a warning post would actually be just
people notifying each other. And then you’ll see
comments, oh, ‘tell Mum’, you know’ (LGOV2).
By doing so, upstream actors provide a clear and
consistent message, while delegating to citizens the
roles of contextualizing, translating and sharing for
vulnerable persons. This is critical because, in
addition to the consistent message, it also helps
address tensions in framing multiple messages to
different groups and getting individuals to act on
them.
[people] will certainly not align themselves to
messages that appear to be directed towards
people with any level of vulnerability or frailty.
(ERO2)
As noted in Figure 1, downstream actors relied on
top-down information but adopted different strategies
in using social media to reach out to their
constituents, either directly or through co-creation of
more contextualized information. Three overlapping
strategies are identified.
Strategy 1–Contextualizing and sensemaking: As a
disaster or crisis unfolds, social media spaces act as a
place for community members to post information
about environmental signals (e.g. smoke), post photos
of flooded roads, inaccessible areas or alerts via
broadcast media, and ask for verification. Thus,
social media is used for resilience building, selfcoordination and providing help [1]. In addition, local
community groups often have someone involved in
the fire service auxiliary that either acts as an
information gateway between upstream and
downstream actors or can help with making sense of
environmental signals.
There’ll be a Bureau of Meteorology extreme
weather warning, we’ll (community group) put
that up (on the social media page) and then that
usually starts a conversation with the community.
Then the community will post back on the site,
images and the community will respond to those
messages. So, we would be posting the official
messages but it sort of takes-off from there with
the community. (COM13)
The sharing of information (as in the quote above)
acts as a catalyst for offline and online information
sharing action, whereby information ‘reverberates’
(COM8) and the process of translating and making
sense for vulnerable persons takes place. This
includes posts about how close a bushfire is to a local
area, where to find places of refuge, or needing help.
It may involve tagging someone to act or pass on a

warning if, for instance, a bushfire is in the vicinity
of someone known to be vulnerable. Significantly, it
may trigger offline chains of notification whereby
one person checks in on another, and so on. This was
noted as particularly significant for refugees/newly
arrived migrants, elderly, and disabled persons.
Strategy 2–Community resilience: This strategy
considers that vulnerable persons may not be
reachable through social media. It focuses on using
social media as a means of making a local
community aware of at-risk groups, with messages
used to encourage action and engagement with
vulnerable persons. This is similar to the approach of
upstream actors, which involves reaching out to
intermediaries and informing the community of atrisk groups: ‘look out for vulnerable, older people in
the community’ (COM2); ‘educating people about
disadvantage and about victims in our community’
(COM4). Within this strategy, action directed at
vulnerable persons is often undertaken offline:
‘Social media for us is more about a broad-brush
approach. Like more broad community...I think for
the vulnerable groups we work with, we would use
other means’ (COM7). This supports the view that
social media is a complementary rather than
substitute tool.
Strategy
3–Reaffirming
top-down
messages:
Downstream actors also refrain from providing
tailored information. That is, while they allow their
social media spaces to be used as places for
information sharing, they do not engage in any
interpretation; instead they prefer to point to topdown information sources—‘don’t come to us for
info, we’re not going to give it to you’ (COM5).
Likewise, a private platform-based actor reported that
they only provide links to official sources but will
provide follow-up assistance accommodating the
language preference of customers by phone, social
media, or email. This is particularly relevant to
tourists. One international NGO managed its social
media strategy at a national level: ‘it’s vanilla…it’s
not dynamic, it’s not moving, it’s not live, it’s not
real, which is the actual premise of those platforms’
(NGO1). This approach was adopted as previously
the NGO had ‘a lot of messaging that was
conflicting—potentially’ (NGO1). However, it used
its platform to re-affirm the top-down message to
vulnerable groups that may be out of the periphery of
upstream actors:
we’re pretty active about getting messages out
there to say, you know, look after yourself,
prepare and have a think about, and just
grabbing the information from the emergency
services…pushing that out…using our trusted
brand to enhance that (NGO1).
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While the quote demonstrates a strategy of reaffirming, the NGO relied on being part of
community groups on social media via its volunteers.
A challenge it faced is that its volunteers are not
‘digital volunteers’ [36]: ‘the volunteers are not that
type of cohort...they’re not Twitter users’ (NGO1).
The NGO was aware of the need for specific
information and is developing strategies to take
generic information and ‘spice it up a little bit with
some real-time information’ (NGO1).

5. Discussion and conclusion
Within the crisis informatics literature, how to
mobilize a timely response to save lives, minimize
damage and losses is a key concern. We have
contributed to this literature by focusing on the
interplay between different actors [4, 6, 8] and the
role of social media in delivering information to
vulnerable persons. We demonstrate how upstream
actors followed a top-down approach and used social
media to reach out to information brokers who may
then engage with vulnerable persons. Downstream
actors adopted three overlapping strategies: Strategies
1 and 2 focused on either contextualizing information
or reaching out to vulnerable persons through
information brokers, while Strategy 3 focused on
reaffirming top-down messages for hard-to-reach
groups (with local action undertaken offline). The
notion of information brokers has been noted in the
crisis informatics literature [35]; we build on this by
showing that they are not only virtual actors but are
also a trusted intermediary for vulnerable persons.
As noted in Figure 1, downstream actors rely on
information from both upstream actors and their
constituents—meaning that information is spread
across time, space and perspectives. In addition,
social media is enacted in different ways at different
levels [18]. Information is shared, tailored and
contextualized in an organic way. We see this as a
process of negotiated meaning, where different parts
of a network of actors distribute, share, interpret and
enact information in different and continuously
evolving ways [37] as a means to deal with
ambiguity. (We also noted community groups that
refrained from using social media for this purpose).
Therefore, we add to the literature that sees disaster
and crisis response as a complex system composed of
adapting and self-organizing actors [7]. In our case,
we see adaptation taking place to meet the needs of
vulnerable persons. This links to the notion of selfreliant communities with the skills, knowledge and
ability to minimize the impacts of hazards.

As organizations are still experimenting with
different ways to provide information to citizens,
particularly vulnerable persons, we identify several
key tensions. The first is between the bureaucratic
model of top-down and generic information and the
demand for information that is location-specific and
contextualized to individuals’ needs. The second lies
in the ongoing difficulty around providing warnings
that people will act on [21]. With vulnerable groups,
a challenge for upstream actors is the balance
between consistent/clear information and targeted/
contextualized information—whilst accounting for
bias against alignment with vulnerability. A third
tension emerges with the growing convergence of
actors and parallel increase in complexity of the
translation process. In these circumstances, divergent
interpretations may take place [18] and may result in
outcomes and behavior that is difficult to predict [7].
There is a need to better explain how platform-based
actors fit in this information landscape. While the
literature has examined platform-based actors, these
have been predominantly managed by traditional
actors e.g. the Red Cross [6]. We have shown how
non-traditional actors are leveraging their platforms
and subsequent connections to provide information.
In our study, vulnerable persons were only given
a voice through the organizational actors. Vulnerable
groups face an enduring problem of low participation
due in part to individual differences in the desire to
be part of a group, low levels of risk awareness, and
low social capital. Further, it merits mentioning that
many vulnerable groups do not consistently use
digital media and complementary research is needed
to examine the broader range of their information
practices; thus, the need to trace translation processes
and flow of second-hand information from social
media. Future research might usefully:
(i) Expand studies to account for the co-creation of
information between vulnerable persons and the
range of organizational actors.
(ii) Focus on specific groups to identify
commonalities and differences across the
category of vulnerability.
(iii) Examine the interactions and content in online
communities used by vulnerable groups, to
uncover appropriate ways to meet the
information needs of vulnerable groups.
(iv) Investigate how upstream and downstream actors
navigate the transition from generic to specific
information, considering the role of social media
and information practices in this process.
(v) Study the convergence of actors [6, 14] and
increasing role of technology [8] for addressing
the concerns of vulnerable persons.
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Appendix 1

Figure 1. Information flows between actors (Note: broken lines emphasize areas of more prominent social
media use; the wavy blue line represents the role of information brokers).
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